Dorm augmented college assignments

Mustafa Oǧuz Afacan ()
Additional contact information
Mustafa Oǧuz Afacan: Qatar University

Social Choice and Welfare, 2024, vol. 62, issue 3, No 8, 609-627

Abstract: Abstract In college assignments, a common practice is that students receive their dorm allocation after the realization of college placements. This causes wasted resources and unfair allocation. To fix this, we consider a college assignment problem where students simultaneously receive their college and dorm assignments. We first introduce the so-called “Dorm Augmented Deferred Acceptance” (DDA) and show that it is stable and efficient. However, it is not student-optimal stable. We then introduce our next mechanism, “Student-Improving Dorm Augmented Deferred Acceptance” (SDDA). It is mainly built on DDA, but with some extra steps to neutralize the student-harming rejection cycles. We show that SDDA is student-optimal stable, efficient, and unanimously preferred to DDA by students. Stability and strategy-proofness are incompatible, implying that neither of these mechanisms is strategy-proof. None of these mechanisms is more manipulable than the other; hence SDDA improves the students’ welfare without an extra strategic cost.

Date: 2024
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00355-024-01510-9 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:62:y:2024:i:3:d:10.1007_s00355-024-01510-9

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... c+theory/journal/355

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-024-01510-9

Access Statistics for this article

Social Choice and Welfare is currently edited by Bhaskar Dutta, Marc Fleurbaey, Elizabeth Maggie Penn and Clemens Puppe

More articles in Social Choice and Welfare from Springer, The Society for Social Choice and Welfare Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().