Partitionable choice functions and stability

Umut Dur (), Thayer Morrill () and William Phan ()
Additional contact information
Umut Dur: North Carolina State University
Thayer Morrill: North Carolina State University
William Phan: North Carolina State University

Social Choice and Welfare, 2024, vol. 63, issue 2, No 5, 359-375

Abstract: Abstract We consider the two-sided many-to-one matching problem and introduce a class of preferences reflecting natural forms of complementarities. For example, academic departments hire seniors and then supporting juniors, teams recruit different roles and specialties, starting with the critical ones, and firms hire workers at various levels, starting with the executives. The key feature is that a firm can partition workers into types and prioritize certain types before others. Despite this partitionability requirement of choice functions being weaker than substitutes—an essential condition concerning the existence of a stable assignment—we show that it still guarantees the existence of a stable assignment and is further a maximal domain for such.

Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00355-024-01534-1 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:63:y:2024:i:2:d:10.1007_s00355-024-01534-1

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... c+theory/journal/355

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-024-01534-1

Access Statistics for this article

Social Choice and Welfare is currently edited by Bhaskar Dutta, Marc Fleurbaey, Elizabeth Maggie Penn and Clemens Puppe

More articles in Social Choice and Welfare from Springer, The Society for Social Choice and Welfare Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().