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Dynamic proportional rankings

Jonas Israel () and Markus Brill ()
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Jonas Israel: TU Berlin
Markus Brill: TU Berlin

Social Choice and Welfare, 2025, vol. 64, issue 1, No 8, 261 pages

Abstract: Abstract Proportional ranking rules aggregate approval-style preferences of agents into a collective ranking such that groups of agents with similar preferences are adequately represented. Motivated by the application of live Q&A platforms, where submitted questions need to be ranked based on the interests of the audience, we study a dynamic extension of the proportional rankings setting. In our setting, the goal is to maintain the proportionality of a ranking when alternatives (i.e., questions)—not necessarily from the top of the ranking—get selected sequentially. We propose generalizations of well-known ranking rules to this setting and study their monotonicity and proportionality properties. We also evaluate the performance of these rules experimentally, using realistic probabilistic assumptions on the selection procedure.

Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-023-01498-8

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