Network creation with homophilic agents

Martin Bullinger (), Pascal Lenzner () and Anna Melnichenko ()
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Martin Bullinger: University of Oxford
Pascal Lenzner: University of Augsburg
Anna Melnichenko: University of Potsdam

Social Choice and Welfare, 2025, vol. 64, issue 4, No 8, 915-959

Abstract: Abstract Network Creation Games are an important framework for understanding the formation of real-world networks. These games usually assume a set of indistinguishable agents strategically buying edges at a uniform price, which leads to the formation of a network among them. However, in real life, agents are heterogeneous and their relationships often display a bias towards similar agents, say of the same ethnic group. This homophilic behavior on the agent level can then lead to the emergent global phenomenon of social segregation. We study Network Creation Games with multiple types of homophilic agents and non-uniform edge cost, introducing two models focusing on the perception of same-type and different-type neighbors, respectively. Despite their different initial conditions, both our theoretical and experimental analysis show that both the composition and segregation strength of the resulting stable networks are very similar, indicating a robust structure of social networks under homophily.

Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-024-01562-x

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