INSURANCE-MARKETS EQUILIBRIUM WITH A NON-CONVEX LABOR SUPPLY DECISION, UNOBSERVABLE EFFORT, AND EFFICIENCY WAGES OF THE “NO-SHIRKING” TYPE

Aleksandar Vasilev

Theoretical and Practical Research in the Economic Fields, 2019, vol. 10, issue 1, 28-34

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to describe the lottery and insurance-market equilibrium in an economy with non-convex labor supply decision, unobservable effort, and efficiency wages of the no-shirking type a la Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). The presence of indivisible labor creates a market incompleteness, which requires that an insurance market for (un) employment be put in operation to "complete" the market.

Date: 2019
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Related works:
Journal Article: Insurance-markets Equilibrium with a Non-convex Labor Supply decision, Unobservable Effort, and Efficiency Wages of the "No-shirking" Type (2019)
Working Paper: Insurance-markets Equilibrium with a Non-convex Labor Supply decision, Unobservable Effort, and Efficiency Wages of the "No-shirking" Type (2018)
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