Insurance-markets Equilibrium with a Non-convex Labor Supply decision, Unobservable Effort, and Efficiency Wages of the "No-shirking" Type

Aleksandar Vasilev

EconStor Preprints from ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to describe the lottery- and insurance-market equilibrium in an economy with non-convex labor supply decision, unobservable effort, and efficiency wages of the no-shirking type a la Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). The presence of indivisible labor creates a market incompleteness, which requires that an insurance market for (un)employment be put in operation to "complete" the market.

Keywords: indivisible labor; lotteries; unobservable effort; insurance; no-shirking efficiency wages (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E1 J22 J41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ias and nep-mac
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/184667/1/ins_mkt_noshirking_wages.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: INSURANCE-MARKETS EQUILIBRIUM WITH A NON-CONVEX LABOR SUPPLY DECISION, UNOBSERVABLE EFFORT, AND EFFICIENCY WAGES OF THE “NO-SHIRKING” TYPE (2019)
Journal Article: Insurance-markets Equilibrium with a Non-convex Labor Supply decision, Unobservable Effort, and Efficiency Wages of the "No-shirking" Type (2019)
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