SOCIAL CONTRACT, PUBLIC CHOICE AND FISCAL REPERCUSSIONS IN THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY

Nicholas Kyriazis and Emmanouil-Marios-Lazaros Economou ()

Theoretical and Practical Research in the Economic Fields, 2013, vol. 4, issue 1, 61-76

Abstract: In the present essay, by utilizing game theory we present a model of choice by actors to explain how change comes about. Then by using ancient and modern sources of literature, we analyze the theory of the social contract as a historical phenomenon that first appeared during the classical period of Athens (510-323 BC.). Then we utilize our findings to explain how public choice was practiced under a direct democracy regime in ancient Athens, by focusing on two historical cases: Eubulus and Lycurgus fiscal policy programs in the second half of the 4th century. We found that these policies can be explained as an implementation of a social contract, through which the Athenian citizens were taking decisions based on rational choice according to a wider economic prospective.

Date: 2013
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Working Paper: Social Contract, public choice and fiscal repercussions in Athenian Democracy (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:srs:jtpref:v:4:y:2013:i:1:p:61-76

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