Social Contract, public choice and fiscal repercussions in Athenian Democracy

Nicholas Kyriazis, Emmanouil-Marios-Lazaros Economou () and Loukas Zachilas

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In the present essay, by utilizing game theory we present a model of choice by actors to explain how change comes about. Then by using ancient and modern sources of literature, we analyse the theory of the social contract as a historical phenomenon that first appeared during the classical period of Athens (510-323 BC.). Then we utilize our findings to explain how public choice was practiced under a direct democracy regime in ancient Athens, by focusing on two historical cases: Eubulus and Lycurgus fiscal policy programs in the second half of the 4th century. We found that these policies can be explained as an implementation of a social contract, through which the Athenian citizens were taking decisions based on rational choice according to a wider economic prospective.

Keywords: model of choice; social contract; 4th century BC Athens (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A14 B15 G28 H44 H53 N43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-09-12
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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