Why the interactions between state- and private-controlled banks matter in the unsuccessful reforms of the Chinese banking industry

Miia Parnaudeau

Asia Pacific Business Review, 2015, vol. 21, issue 2, 155-169

Abstract: Despite significant reforms of the banking system, the existing market in which Chinese banks operate is reminiscent of a cartel. On the basis of illustrations relying on 'game theory', the interactions between the credit allocations of state banks and private-controlled banks are highlighted. The very particular status of public banks creates serious barriers to the convergence of credit allocations towards more transparent and more cautious practices. This work intends to discuss a new model in which, in the existing system, 'win-win-win' solutions may still appear under some conditions.

Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/13602381.2014.963446 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:apbizr:v:21:y:2015:i:2:p:155-169

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/FAPB20

DOI: 10.1080/13602381.2014.963446

Access Statistics for this article

Asia Pacific Business Review is currently edited by Professor Chris Rowley and Malcolm Warner

More articles in Asia Pacific Business Review from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().