Risk-averse agents with peer pressure

Kohei Daido

Applied Economics Letters, 2004, vol. 11, issue 6, 383-386

Abstract: This article studies the effects of peer pressure on the incentives of risk-averse agents. It defines the peer pressure function and then assumes that each agent feels peer pressure not only when his effort level is below the standard level, but also when it is above that level. It also supposes that agents are heterogeneous in terms of their productivity and the degree to which they respond to peer pressure. It shows that a principal provides incentives that depend on the effects of peer pressure and risk-sharing.

Date: 2004
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DOI: 10.1080/1350485042000228240

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