Manipulation in political stock markets - preconditions and evidence

Jan Hansen, Carsten Schmidt and Martin Strobel

Applied Economics Letters, 2004, vol. 11, issue 7, 459-463

Abstract: Political stock markets (PSM) are sometimes seen as substitutes for opinion polls. On the bases of a behavioural model, specific preconditions were drawn out under which manipulation in PSM can weaken this argument. Evidence for manipulation is reported from the data of two separate PSM during the Berlin 1999 state elections.

Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

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Working Paper: Manipulation in political stock markets - preconditions and evidence (2004)
Working Paper: Manipulation in political stock markets: Preconditions and evidence (2001)
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DOI: 10.1080/1350485042000191700

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