Manipulation in political stock markets: Preconditions and evidence

Jan Hansen, Carsten Schmidt and Martin Strobel

No 2001,61, SFB 373 Discussion Papers from Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes

Abstract: Political stock markets (PSM) are sometimes seen as substitutes for opinion polls. On the bases of a behavioral model, specific preconditions were drawn out under which manipulation in PSM can weaken this argument. Evidence for manipulation is reported from the data of two separate PSM during the Berlin 99 state elections.

Keywords: prognosis; political stock markets; decisive vote illusion; manipulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 D4 G1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Related works:
Journal Article: Manipulation in political stock markets - preconditions and evidence (2004)
Working Paper: Manipulation in political stock markets - preconditions and evidence (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:sfb373:200161

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