Student effort: standards vs. tournaments

Pedro Landeras ()

Applied Economics Letters, 2009, vol. 16, issue 9, 965-969

Abstract: In this article we compare a competency system based on an absolute standard vs. a competitive grading system (tournament) in terms of the student effort level they are able to motivate. We prove, unlike other previous work, that more risk does not always discourage effort under a competency grading system. Furthermore, relative advantage depends crucially on the nature of the noise distorting academic achievement. If systematic factors prevail then a tournament is preferred to a competency system based on absolute standards, while if idiosyncratic factors predominate the last is more efficient. Comparisons are effective only and only if the passing standard is fixed at the efficient level that promotes in the student the highest optimal effort.

Date: 2009
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.informaworld.com/openurl?genre=article& ... 40C6AD35DC6213A474B5 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:16:y:2009:i:9:p:965-969

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/RAEL20

DOI: 10.1080/13504850701222129

Access Statistics for this article

Applied Economics Letters is currently edited by Anita Phillips

More articles in Applied Economics Letters from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().