Strategic interactions and belief formation: an experiment

Kyle Hyndman, Antoine Terracol and Jonathan Vaksmann

Applied Economics Letters, 2010, vol. 17, issue 17, 1681-1685

Abstract: Traditional models of belief formation in repeated games assume adaptive players who do not take strategic interactions into account. We find that these approaches are limited in the sense that people think more strategically and realize that, in contrast with the classical view, their own actions are likely to influence their opponents' behaviour.

Date: 2010
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Related works:
Working Paper: Strategic interactions and belief formation: An experiment (2010)
Working Paper: Strategic interactions and belief formation: An experiment (2010)
Working Paper: Strategic interactions and belief formation: An experiment (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:17:y:2010:i:17:p:1681-1685

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DOI: 10.1080/13504850903120691

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