Strategic interactions and belief formation: An experiment

Kyle Hyndman, Antoine Terracol and Jonathan Vaksmann ()
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Jonathan Vaksmann: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: Traditional models of belief formation in repeated games assume adaptive players who do not take strategic interactions into account. We find that these approaches are limited in the sense that people think more strategically and realize that, in contrast with the classical view, their own actions are likely to influence their opponents' behaviour.

Keywords: behaviour; games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00607238v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Applied Economics Letters, 2010, 17 (17), pp.1681-1685. ⟨10.1080/13504850903120691⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Strategic interactions and belief formation: an experiment (2010)
Working Paper: Strategic interactions and belief formation: An experiment (2010)
Working Paper: Strategic interactions and belief formation: An experiment (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:pseptp:hal-00607238

DOI: 10.1080/13504850903120691

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