Cost minimizing sequential punishment policies for repeat offenders

Evgenia Motchenkova

Applied Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 21, issue 5, 360-365

Abstract: This article discusses optimal sanctions for repeat offenders. We analysed a multi-period decision problem, where the regulator's main objectives are to block any violations of law and to minimize the costs of crime control. We conclude that, when offenders are identical and wealth constrained, the government is resource constrained, can perfectly observe illicit gains and commits to a certain policy throughout the whole planning horizon, forward-looking solution implies that cost minimizing deterrence is decreasing in the number of offenses. This analysis is relevant in case when imprisonment is not commonly used, only monetary sanctions are allowed and limited liability of offenders plays an important role. The examples are tax evasion, violations of environmental regulations and violations of competition law.

Date: 2014
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DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2013.861579

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