Cost Minimizing Sequential Punishment Policies for Repeat Offenders

Evgenia Motchenkova

No 8, Serie Research Memoranda from VU University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Econometrics

Abstract: This paper concludes that, when offenders are wealth constrained and the government is resource constrained and can commit to a certain policy throughout the whole planning horizon, cost minimizing deterrence is decreasing, rather than increasing, in the number of offenses. By extending the framework, suggested in Emons (2003), to n-periods setting, we prove that for the agents who may commit an act several times, optimal sanctions are such that the fine for the first crime equals the offender's entire wealth, and the fines are zero for all the subsequent crimes. This result contradicts the widely prevailing escalating penalties imbedded in many penal codes and sentencing guidelines. In addition, analogous to Emons (2004), this scheme does not appear to be a time consistent (subgame perfect) strategy for the government in an n-periods setting. Moreover, we show that, if the government cannot commit, equal rather than decreasing sanctions will be optimal.

Keywords: Crime and punishment; Repeat offenders; Subgame perfection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 K41 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Journal Article: Cost minimizing sequential punishment policies for repeat offenders (2014)
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