Democracies cooperate more: even where it threatens to bite?

Philipp Hühne, Birgit Meyer, Peter Nunnenkamp and Martin Roy

Applied Economics Letters, 2016, vol. 23, issue 11, 812-815

Abstract: Estimating two-step selection models, we find that more democratic governments are more likely to conclude preferential trade agreements (PTAs) and to agree to stricter investment provisions related to pre-establishment national treatment and investor–state dispute settlement in PTAs. This is surprising when considering the potentially high costs of litigation.

Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2015.1111979

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