Democracies cooperate more: Even where it threatens to bite?

Philipp Hühne, Birgit Meyer, Peter Nunnenkamp and Martin Roy

No 2004, Kiel Working Papers from Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel)

Abstract: Estimating two-step selection models, we find that more democratic governments are more likely to conclude preferential trade agreements (PTAs) and to agree to stricter investment provisions related to pre-establishment national treatment and investor-state dispute settlement in PTAs. This is surprising when considering the potentially high costs of litigation.

Keywords: preferential trade agreements (PTA); investor-state dispute settlement; national treatment; democracy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Journal Article: Democracies cooperate more: even where it threatens to bite? (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:2004

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