Monitoring ’lemons’: why lower productivity workers are sometimes monitored more closely

Marcus Dittrich () and Silvio Städter

Applied Economics Letters, 2021, vol. 28, issue 9, 737-741

Abstract: We analyse workplace monitoring in a principal–agent model with two types of workers who differ in their productivity. The firm decides on the effort level, the wage and the monitoring intensity for both workers. We find that the elasticities of the workers’ effort-cost function and the firm’s monitoring-cost function affect the firm’s monitoring intensity. Our results imply that the firm might monitor the low-productive worker more closely than the high-productive worker.

Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/13504851.2020.1776826 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:28:y:2021:i:9:p:737-741

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/RAEL20

DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2020.1776826

Access Statistics for this article

Applied Economics Letters is currently edited by Anita Phillips

More articles in Applied Economics Letters from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().