Freeze-out mergers: the case of shareholders with multiple shares

Kyounghun Lee and Frederick Dongchuhl Oh

Applied Economics Letters, 2024, vol. 31, issue 1, 65-70

Abstract: This paper investigates the role of freeze-out mergers in mitigating the free-rider problem in tender offers. In contrast to a framework in which each shareholder owns exactly one share, our model allows shareholders to have multiple shares. We find that a more aggressive freeze-out clause forces shareholders to tender more shares. Therefore, raiders capture a greater amount of surplus when the requirement for freeze-out mergers becomes easier to satisfy.

Date: 2024
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/13504851.2022.2125492 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:31:y:2024:i:1:p:65-70

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/RAEL20

DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2022.2125492

Access Statistics for this article

Applied Economics Letters is currently edited by Anita Phillips

More articles in Applied Economics Letters from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().