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On Coasean bargaining with transaction costs

Thomas Rhoads () and Jason Shogren ()

Applied Economics Letters, 1999, vol. 6, issue 12, 779-783

Abstract: The letter explores how transaction costs affect the efficiency and rationality of Coasian bargaining. Efficiency remained relatively robust with low transaction costs, but was significantly reduced with high transaction costs. A cheap talk protocol increased efficiency. Rationality was dominated by constrained self-interest.

Date: 1999
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DOI: 10.1080/135048599352150

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Handle: RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:6:y:1999:i:12:p:779-783