A delegated agent in a winner-takes-all contest

Lambert Schoonbeek

Applied Economics Letters, 2002, vol. 9, issue 1, 21-23

Abstract: A standard winner-takes-all rent-seeking contest with a principal-agent relationship is extended. One of the two players offers a contract to an agent to act as a delegate on his behalf. The wage offered to the agent is deliberately chosen. The equilibrium of the extended contest is characterized.

Date: 2002
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.informaworld.com/openurl?genre=article& ... 40C6AD35DC6213A474B5 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: A delegated agent in a winner-take-all contest (1999)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:9:y:2002:i:1:p:21-23

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/RAEL20

DOI: 10.1080/13504850110049333

Access Statistics for this article

Applied Economics Letters is currently edited by Anita Phillips

More articles in Applied Economics Letters from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().