A delegated agent in a winner-take-all contest

Lambert Schoonbeek

No 99B47, Research Report from University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management)

Abstract: We consider a winner-take-all contest extended with a principal-agent re-lationship. One of the two players, say player 1, offers a contract to an agent to act in the contest as a delegate on his behalf. The wage offered to the agent is deliberately chosen by player 1. We characterize the Nash equilibrium of this contest and com-pare its properties with those of the Nash equilibrium of the corresponding standard contest in which both players compete themselves. We show that the expected utility of player 1 is larger in the contest with a delegate if he is strongly risk averse with respect to his money income and moreover the contested prize is large enough.

Date: 1999
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://irs.ub.rug.nl/ppn/188209212 (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 403 Forbidden (http://irs.ub.rug.nl/ppn/188209212 [302 Found]--> https://irs.ub.rug.nl/ppn/188209212 [302 Found]--> https://www.rug.nl/research/portal/publications/pub(61c2502d-7dd5-4afd-a179-f9bf74037b68).html [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://research.rug.nl/en/publications/pub(61c2502d-7dd5-4afd-a179-f9bf74037b68).html)

Related works:
Journal Article: A delegated agent in a winner-takes-all contest (2002)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gro:rugsom:99b47

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Research Report from University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Hanneke Tamling ().