Overcompensation by severance payments

Christian Grund

Applied Economics, 2006, vol. 38, issue 8, 925-930

Abstract: An important aim of severance payments is to reduce the economic disadvantages of dismissed employees. However, it may well be the case that a considerable fraction of employees is actually better off, if they are re-employed shortly after their dismissal. This is the first attempt to estimate the relevance of overcompensation by severance payments. It is found that about 7% of dismissed employees or about one quarter of those with severance payments are overcompensated in Germany. In particular, employees with many years of tenure have chances to receive severance payments as well as wage increases in their new jobs subsequent to dismissal.

Date: 2006
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00036840600581950 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:applec:v:38:y:2006:i:8:p:925-930

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/RAEC20

DOI: 10.1080/00036840600581950

Access Statistics for this article

Applied Economics is currently edited by Anita Phillips

More articles in Applied Economics from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().