Workplace drug prevention programs: does zero tolerance work?

Stephen Mehay and Natalie Webb ()

Applied Economics, 2007, vol. 39, issue 21, 2743-2751

Abstract: Current drug policy in the US military mandates frequent random drug testing of service members and dismissal of those who test positive for illegal drugs. This article analyses the economic costs and benefits of this zero tolerance policy as applied in the US Navy. Program effects consist of the actual number of detected users and the predicted number of deterred potential users. Productivity losses imposed by drug users are based on reported annual workdays lost due to drug use in the Navy. The productivity losses avoided by deterring and detecting users constitute program benefits. Program costs include the cost of replacing service members who are dismissed under the zero tolerance policy. Net benefits are sensitive to three key parameters - the deterrence effect, replacement cost, and productivity losses due to drug use. The results show that net benefits are negative for most plausible values of the key parameters.

Date: 2007
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DOI: 10.1080/00036840600749532

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