Self-selection in the market of teachers

Juan Correa, Francisco Parro and Loreto Reyes

Applied Economics, 2015, vol. 47, issue 13, 1331-1349

Abstract: Public school teachers are usually paid according to centralized earning schedules, in which their income depends mainly on experience. By contrast, in private schools, there is high wage dispersion, and salaries correspond mainly to teachers' performance. That dichotomous labour regulation encourages teachers with better unobservable skills to self-select into private schools because the likelihood of earning higher wages is higher than in public schools. The other side of the coin is the self-selection of 'bad' teachers into public schools. Using a representative sample of Chilean teachers, we estimate a two-sector Roy model to test self-selection. We find evidence of negative self-selection of teachers into public schools.

Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2014.995365

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