Effects of transparency, monetary policy signalling and clarity of central bank communication on disagreement about inflation expectations

Gabriel Montes, Luciano Oliveira, A. Curi and Rodolfo Nicolay

Applied Economics, 2016, vol. 48, issue 7, 590-607

Abstract: The literature on transparency and central bank communication and the literature on disagreement about expectations are evolving; however, both have been evolving separately. Despite the advances in the literature, several key issues remain open and there are gaps to be filled. Therefore, this study analyses the effects of monetary policy signalling and clarity of central bank communication on disagreement about inflation expectations. It also investigates whether greater transparency coincides with lower levels of disagreement in inflation expectations in Brazil. The findings suggest that transparency is important to reduce disagreement about inflation expectations. Moreover, our estimates indicate that central bank communication and clarity affect disagreement about inflation expectations in Brazil.

Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2015.1083091

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