Extricating the state: The move to competitive capture in post-communist Bulgaria

Andrew Barnes

Europe-Asia Studies, 2007, vol. 59, issue 1, 71-95

Abstract: This article uses the Bulgarian case to analyse movement from a situation of what appeared to be a ‘Partial-Reform Equilibrium’ to an ‘Equilibrium of Competitive Capture’. In such a process, elections are important forces for change, but not because they bring reformist parties to power or lead to completed economic liberalisation. Instead, especially in the first several electoral cycles in a new democracy, they can bring to power new leaders who are not beholden to existing captors, but rather to other clients that would like to capture the state for their own interests. Over time, the country experiences a parade of captors, eventually leading to a system where no single group owns the state, but where it is still not insulated. Instead, several competing groups fight with each other to raid it for their own benefits.

Date: 2007
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DOI: 10.1080/09668130601072688

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