Keynes and the Non-neutrality of Russian War Finance during World War One

Vincent Barnett

Europe-Asia Studies, 2009, vol. 61, issue 5, 797-812

Abstract: This article examines the particular methods of war finance that were used by Russia during World War One in relation to the total cost of the war, and evaluates them against a theoretical ideal that was outlined by the Cambridge economist J. M. Keynes. It then asks whether there were any consequences of two particular chosen means of financing the war—the issue of large amounts of paper currency and short-term treasury bills—for maintaining Russian economic stability. The evaluations of a number of Russian and British economists are used as gauges of Keynes's advice, and also as more general comparison in relation to the equivalent policies pursued by other Allied countries.

Date: 2009
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DOI: 10.1080/09668130902905008

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