How Much Control is Enough? Monitoring and Enforcement under Stalin

Andrei Markevich

Europe-Asia Studies, 2011, vol. 63, issue 8, 1449-1468

Abstract: The article examines the control system that Stalin established to enforce his orders. Historical records demonstrate that Stalin designed the system's scope, organisation and credentials to maximise its cost-effectiveness. On several occasions Stalin deliberately limited the system's size and stimulated whistle-blowing in an attempt to mitigate running costs. In contrast, distorted preferences and constraints on inspectors’ loyalty contributed to the multiplication of the number of monitoring agencies. Because his orders were incomplete, Stalin authorised his inspectors not only to monitor, but also to intervene in operational matters wherever necessary.

Date: 2011
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Working Paper: How Much Control is Enough? Monitoring and Enforcement under Stalin (2007)
Working Paper: How Much Control is Enough? Monitoring and Enforcement under Stalin (2007)
Working Paper: How Much Control is Enough? Monitoring and Enforcement under Stalin (2007)
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DOI: 10.1080/09668136.2011.601116

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