Authoritarian Electoral Engineering and its Limits: A Curious Case of the Imperiali Highest Averages Method in Russia

Grigorii V. Golosov

Europe-Asia Studies, 2014, vol. 66, issue 10, 1611-1628

Abstract: This study examines the limits of electoral engineering in a consolidating authoritarian regime by focusing on the case of the Imperiali highest averages method of proportional seat allocation in Russia's regional legislative elections. The Imperiali method strongly disadvantages the opposition. But, in the absence of political constraint or trends towards liberalisation, most of the regional decision makers still chose a more permissive formula. The trade-off among the incentives to solidify the power monopoly, to maintain the democratic façade of the regime and to co-opt the opposition was achieved by rejecting the least permissive electoral formula and choosing a middle-of-the-road solution instead.

Date: 2014
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DOI: 10.1080/09668136.2014.967553

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