Market-Oriented Reforms as a Tool of State-Building: Russian Pension Reform in 2001

Sarah Wilson Sokhey

Europe-Asia Studies, 2015, vol. 67, issue 5, 695-717

Abstract: Despite domestic opposition and several policy alternatives, in 2001 the Russian government adopted a pension reform that was potentially costly and had uncertain long-term benefits. Demographic and fiscal pressures created the desire to reform and a more cooperative Duma made it possible to do so. These points do not explain why Putin chose the pension privatisation option. Russia's pension reform is best understood as part of a state-building strategy to diminish the role of powerful bureaucracies. Russia's welfare state was not merely the product of a powerful and popular president, but rather a tool to create a stronger executive.

Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1080/09668136.2015.1045453

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