When Children Join the Coalition: Apparent Hereditary Grooming as a Power-Preservation Tool in Post-Soviet Autocracies

Jakob Tolstrup and Thomas Ambrosio

Europe-Asia Studies, 2025, vol. 77, issue 1, 107-132

Abstract: Why does what appears to be hereditary grooming—promoting children to positions of political power—remain widespread in dictatorships even though successful hereditary successions are relatively rare? We analyse an original dataset on apparent hereditary grooming events across all autocracies in the post-Soviet region from 1992 to 2019. We show that apparent grooming is surprisingly normal in post-Soviet autocracies and that the political positioning of children is driven by demonstration effects and rulers’ need to consolidate or expand control over the ruling coalition. The article improves our understanding of autocratic succession, regime stability and ruler–elite relations in post-Soviet autocracies and beyond.

Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1080/09668136.2024.2432922

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