An evolutionary game theoretical approach to the theory of international regimes

Nuno Garoupa and João Gata

Defence and Peace Economics, 1999, vol. 10, issue 3, 225-246

Abstract: By way of an evolutionary game model we show that mediation in international conflicts might be harmful to the conflicting parties. In fact, under anarchy both parties can be better off than under an international regime if mediation reduces the parties' reactive capacities (i.e. their abilites to respond to an aggression). This result is applied to issues currently discussed in the literature on international relations such as the role of the United Nations as a mediator of international conflicts.

Keywords: Conflict; Anarchy; International regime; Evolutionary game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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DOI: 10.1080/10430719908404925

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