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Raphael Franck (), Arye Hillman () and Miriam Krausz

Defence and Peace Economics, 2005, vol. 16, issue 5, 347-364

Abstract: The economic theory of defense has traditionally described public safety as achieved through investments that deter adversaries. Deterrence is, however, ineffective and pre-emptive defense is required when a population of intended victims confronts supreme-value suicide terror. A moral dilemma then arises, since pre-emption may impose collective punishment, while in the absence of pre-emption the population of intended victims is exposed to acts of terror. We consider how a population of intended terror victims confronts the moral dilemma, and compare the threatened population's response with the public-safety recommendations of external judges who are not personally affected by the threat of terror.

Keywords: Defense economics; Defensive pre-emption; Counter-terrorism; Terror; International judges; Profiling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Working Paper: Public Safety and the Moral Dilemma in the Defense Against Terror (2004) Downloads
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DOI: 10.1080/10242690500207399

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