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Public Safety and the Moral Dilemma in the Defense Against Terror

Raphael Franck (), Arye Hillman () and Miriam Krausz

No 4736, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: The economic theory of defense has traditionally described public safety as achieved through investments that deter adversaries. Deterrence is however ineffective, and preemptive defense is required, when a population of intended victims confronts supreme-value suicide terror. A moral dilemma then arises, since preemption may impose collective punishment, while, in the absence of preemption, the population of intended victims is exposed to acts of terror. We consider how a population of intended terror victims confronts the moral dilemma, and compare the threatened population’s response with the public-safety recommendations of external judges who are not personally affected by the threat of terror.

Keywords: counter-terrorism; Defense economics; defensive preemption; international judges; profiling; terror (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 H56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe
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Journal Article: PUBLIC SAFETY AND THE MORAL DILEMMA IN THE DEFENSE AGAINST TERROR (2005) Downloads
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