Public Safety and the Moral Dilemma in the Defense Against Terror

Arye Hillman (), Miriam Krausz and Raphael Franck

No 4736, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: The economic theory of defense has traditionally described public safety as achieved through investments that deter adversaries. Deterrence is however ineffective, and preemptive defense is required, when a population of intended victims confronts supreme-value suicide terror. A moral dilemma then arises, since preemption may impose collective punishment, while, in the absence of preemption, the population of intended victims is exposed to acts of terror. We consider how a population of intended terror victims confronts the moral dilemma, and compare the threatened population?s response with the public-safety recommendations of external judges who are not personally affected by the threat of terror.

Keywords: Defense economics; Defensive preemption; Counter-terrorism; Terror; International judges; Profiling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 H56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe
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Journal Article: PUBLIC SAFETY AND THE MORAL DILEMMA IN THE DEFENSE AGAINST TERROR (2005)
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