AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

Shirley Ho ()

Defence and Peace Economics, 2007, vol. 18, issue 6, 485-493

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to provide an economic analysis of military intelligence by using the approach in contract theory to understand when a spy will be hired by a country, why a spy will defect, and how the enemy can use a double agent to fight back. Most importantly, we will provide four solutions to this defection problem in a spy contract using related discussions in the economic literature.

Keywords: Spies; Double agents; Defection; Military intelligence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10242690701197571 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:defpea:v:18:y:2007:i:6:p:485-493

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/GDPE20

DOI: 10.1080/10242690701197571

Access Statistics for this article

Defence and Peace Economics is currently edited by Professor Keith Hartley

More articles in Defence and Peace Economics from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().