CHOOSING GENOCIDE: ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON THE DISTURBING RATIONALITY OF RACE MURDER

Charles Anderton

Defence and Peace Economics, 2010, vol. 21, issue 5-6, 459-486

Abstract: An economic theory of genocide is presented with application to Rwanda-1994. The theory considers 'macro' conditions under which an authority group chooses genocide and 'micro' conditions that facilitate the spread of genocide. From the macro perspective, a bargaining model highlights four rational explanations for an authority's choice of genocide: prevention of loss of power, indivisibility, elimination of a persistent rival, and political bias. From the micro perspective, an evolutionary game model shows how supporters of genocide gain the upper hand in group dynamics over resisters and bystanders. The theory and application suggest that the conditions for genocide are not exceptional.

Keywords: Genocide; Conflict; Bargaining; Game Theory; Rwanda (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Working Paper: Choosing Genocide: Economic Perspectives On The Disturbing Rationality Of Race Murder (2010)
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DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2010.513478

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