Choosing Genocide: Economic Perspectives On The Disturbing Rationality Of Race Murder

Charles Anderton

No 1006, Working Papers from College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics

Abstract: An economic theory of genocide is presented with application to Rwanda-1994. The theory considers 'macro' conditions under which an authority group chooses genocide and 'micro' conditions that facilitate the spread of genocide. From the macro perspective, a bargaining model highlights four rational explanations for an authority's choice of genocide: prevention of loss of power, indivisibility, elimination of a persistent rival, and political bias. From the micro perspective, an evolutionary game model shows how supporters of genocide gain the upper hand in group dynamics over resisters and bystanders. The theory and application suggest that the conditions for genocide are not exceptional.

Keywords: Genocide; Conflict; Bargaining; Game Theory; Rwanda (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D74 H56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2010-12
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in Defense and Peace Economics, Volume 21, Number 5-6, 2010, Pages 459-486

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Related works:
Journal Article: CHOOSING GENOCIDE: ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON THE DISTURBING RATIONALITY OF RACE MURDER (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hcx:wpaper:1006

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