Dynamic Winner-Take-All Conflict

Rafael Reuveny, John Maxwell and Jefferson Davis

Defence and Peace Economics, 2011, vol. 22, issue 5, 471-492

Abstract: We develop a model of repeated conflict that features probabilistic winner-take-all outcomes and compare its dynamics to the dynamics generated by a similar deterministic model in which combatants divide the conflict spoils. While these models generate the same behavior in a one-shot game, in a repeated setting the winner-take-all model generates richer dynamics than the dynamics generated by the deterministic model, which are new to the economics literature on conflict. As in real-world conflicts, the winner-take-all model generates changes in the relative dominance of combatants, full mobilization of fighting resources, and endogenous surrender. We evaluate the implications for the literature.

Date: 2011
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Working Paper: Dynamic Winner-take-all Conflict (2007)
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DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2011.566254

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