STRATEGIC DEFENSE AND ATTACK FOR SERIES AND PARALLEL RELIABILITY SYSTEMS: COMMENT

Dan Kovenock and Brian Roberson

Defence and Peace Economics, 2012, vol. 23, issue 5, 507-515

Abstract: The contest-theoretic literature on the attack and defense of networks of targets focuses primarily on pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Hausken's 2008 European Journal of Operational Research article typifies this approach, and many of the models in this literature either build upon this model or utilize similar techniques. We show that Hausken's characterization of Nash equilibrium is invalid for much of the parameter space examined and provides necessary conditions for his solution to hold. The complete characterization of mixed-strategy equilibria remains an open problem, although there exist solutions in the literature for special prominent cases.

Date: 2012
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Working Paper: Strategic Defense and Attack for Series and Parallel Reliability Systems: Comment (2010)
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DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2012.660606

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