Strategic Defense and Attack for Series and Parallel Reliability Systems: Comment

Dan Kovenock and Brian Roberson

Purdue University Economics Working Papers from Purdue University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Hausken (2008a) formulates a contest-theoretic model of the attack and defense of a network of targets. This note identi es a technical error that invalidates Hausken's characterization of Nash equilibrium for a substantial portion of the parameter space that he examines and provides necessary conditions for his solution to form a pure- strategy Nash equilibrium. Many of the existing results in the contest-theoretic liter- ature on the attack and defense of networks of targets rely upon Hausken's (2008a) characterization and require corresponding parameter restrictions. When these restric- tions are not met, the analysis of Clark and Konrad (2007) and Kovenock and Roberson (2010a) provides a foundation for constructing mixed-strategy Nash equilibria.

Keywords: Game theory; Reliability theory; OR in military; Con ict; Contest; Network; Colonel Blotto game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D74 H56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
Date: 2010-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pur:prukra:1253

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