Strategic Defense And Attack For Series And Parallel Reliability Systems: Rejoinder

Dan Kovenock and Brian Roberson

Defence and Peace Economics, 2012, vol. 23, issue 5, 521-524

Abstract: In our original comment, we showed that Hausken's characterization of Nash equilibrium is invalid for much of the parameter space examined and provided necessary conditions for his solution to hold. Most of the comments in his reply are either tangential or irrelevant. However, several of the claims made in the reply reveal continuing misunderstandings and gaps in his understanding. In this rejoinder, we briefly clarify the fundamental issues.

Date: 2012
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DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2012.660607

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