Strategic Defense and Attack for Series and Parallel Reliability Systems: Rejoinder

Dan Kovenock and Brian Roberson

Purdue University Economics Working Papers from Purdue University, Department of Economics

Abstract: In our original comment, we showed that Hausken's characterization of Nash equilibrium is invalid for much of the parameter space examined and provided necessary conditions for his solution to hold. Most of the comments in his reply are either tangential or irrelevant. However, several of the claims made in the reply reveal continuing misunderstandings and gaps in his understanding. In this rejoinder, we brie y clarify the fundamental issues.

Keywords: Game theory; OR in military; Con ict, Contest, Network, Colonel Blotto game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D74 H56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 43 pages
Date: 2012-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pur:prukra:1268

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