Evolutionary determinants of war

Kai Konrad and Florian Morath

Defence and Peace Economics, 2016, vol. 27, issue 4, 520-534

Abstract: This paper considers evolutionarily stable decisions about whether to initiate violent conflict rather than accepting a peaceful sharing outcome. Focusing on small sets of players such as countries in a geographically confined area, we use the concept of evolutionary stability in finite populations. We find that players’ evolutionarily stable preferences widen the range of peaceful resource allocations that are rejected in favor of violent conflict, compared to the Nash equilibrium outcomes. Relative advantages in fighting strength are reflected in the equilibrium set of peaceful resource allocations.

Date: 2016
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Working Paper: Evolutionary determinants of war (2013)
Working Paper: Evolutionary determinants of war (2013)
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DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2014.995890

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