Evolutionary determinants of war

Kai Konrad and Florian Morath

Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change from WZB Berlin Social Science Center

Abstract: This paper considers evolutionarily stable decisions about whether to initiate violent conflict rather than accepting a peaceful sharing outcome. Focusing on small sets of players such as countries in a geographically confined area, we use Schaffer's (1988) concept of evolutionary stability. We find that players' evolutionarily stable preferences widen the range of peaceful resource allocations that are rejected in favor of violent conflict, compared to the Nash equilibrium outcomes. Relative advantages in fighting strength are reflected in the equilibrium set of peaceful resource allocations.

Keywords: Conflict; Contest; Endogenous fighting; Balance of power; Evolutionary stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo and nep-hpe
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Related works:
Journal Article: Evolutionary determinants of war (2016)
Working Paper: Evolutionary determinants of war (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:wzbeoc:spii2013302

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