Transnational policing: preemption and deterrence against elusive perpetrators

Keisuke Nakao

Defence and Peace Economics, 2019, vol. 30, issue 3, 349-366

Abstract: Why does a state directly police certain kinds of transnational perpetrators by itself while indirectly policing other kinds through their host government? To address this question, we develop a formal model, where Defender chooses either to police Perpetrators or to make Proxy do so. According to our theory, the delegation of policing can enhance its effectiveness in light of Proxy’s three advantages: (a) Proxy can convince Perpetrators of punishments more credibly than Defender (communicative advantage); (b) Proxy is more likely to identify Perpetrators and detect what they hold dear (informational advantage); (c) Proxy can cripple and punish Perpetrators more effectively (offensive advantage). On the other hand, the delegation may cause inefficiency if Defender has limited information about Proxy’s choice or cost of policing. Depending on the relative size between these advantages and disadvantages, one of the following four forms of policing may emerge: (i) Defender polices Perpetrators on her own (e.g. Somali counter-piracy operations); (ii) Defender induces Proxy to police Perpetrators (U.S. War on Drugs in Colombia and Mexico); (iii) Defender and Proxy together police Perpetrators (Operation Inherent Resolve); (iv) two or more Defender-Proxy states police Perpetrators in each’s own domain (Interpol, Budapest Convention).

Date: 2019
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Working Paper: Transnational Policing: Preemption and Deterrence against Elusive Perpetrators (2016)
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DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2017.1331081

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