EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Transnational Policing: Preemption and Deterrence against Elusive Perpetrators

Keisuke Nakao

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Why does a state directly police certain kinds of transnational perpetrators by itself while indirectly policing other kinds through their host government? To address this question, we develop a formal model, where Defender chooses either to police Perpetrators or to make Proxy do so. According to our theory, the delegation of policing can enhance its effectiveness in light of Proxy’s advantages in threatening, identifying, and attacking Perpetrators, but it may also cause inefficiency if Defender has limited information about Proxy’s choice or cost of policing. Depending on the relative size between these advantages and disadvantages, one of the following four forms of policing may emerge: (i) Defender polices Perpetrators on her own (e.g., Somali counter-piracy operations); (ii) Defender induces Proxy to police Perpetrators (U.S. War on Drugs); (iii) Defender and Proxy together police Perpetrators (Operation Inherent Resolve); (iv) two or more Defender-Proxy states police Perpetrators in each’s own domain (Interpol).

Keywords: cyberattack; deterrence; policing; piracy; preemption; terrorism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F51 F52 F53 H56 H77 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-07-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/72676/1/MPRA_paper_72676.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:72676

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:72676